



Storm / Watch by GreyNoise Intelligence

GreyNoise Intelligence

TECHNOLOGY · UPDATED WEEKLY

GreyNoise Storm Watch is a weekly podcast and livestream hosted by GreyNoise Intelligence (https://www.greynoise.io), a cybersecurity company that focuses on understanding internet noise. The show features hosts b моге

https://pod.greynoise-storm.watch/

https://show.greynoise-storm.watch/







TAGSMAS IS HERE!



https://www.greynoise.io/12-days-of-tagsmas

THE 12 DAYS OF

TAGSMAS

A special holiday calendar featuring tags and detections from 2023, presented by <u>GreyNoise Labs</u>.

 SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	5 A T
26	27			30	Ø1	02
03	04	05	06	07	08	09
10	• 11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19		21	22	23




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About Trinity Cyber

https://www.trinitycyber.com/

The Future of Cybersecurity

At Trinity Cyber, our mission is to stop the bad guys. We invented and patented a groundbreaking new approach to cybersecurity that identifies, stops and prevents threats others miss. Our technology is the first in the industry that can deeply inspect full session Internet traffic in both directions to expose and mitigate threat content inline. We are solving the four biggest challenges for customers today with better security, automated vulnerability mitigation, reduced alert fatigue and fewer false positives.





BREAKING

Log in

https://docs.newrelic.com/docs/security/new-relic-security/security-bulletins/security-bulletin-nr23-01-security-advisory/



Security Bulletin NR23-01 — Security Advisory

Incident report update: December 1, 2023

Following considerable progress in our investigation, we are now in a more informed position to share with our customers additional details about the ongoing investigation and what we have learned.

What happened—initial attack on New Relic staging environment

Two weeks ago, New Relic became aware of unauthorized access to our staging environment, an internal environment that provides visibility into how our customers are using New Relic and certain logs. Telemetry and application data sent to New Relic by our customers in their use of the New Relic platform does not reside in our staging environment.

We immediately launched an investigation and discovered that an unauthorized actor used stolen credentials and social engineering in connection with a New Relic employee account. The unauthorized actor used the stolen credentials to gain access to our staging environment, where they were able to view certain data pertaining to our customers' use of New Relic. **Customers confirmed to have been impacted by this incident have been**



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New Relic identified unauthorized access to their staging environment two weeks ago.

The staging environment provides insights into customer usage and certain logs.

Customer telemetry and application data, which is sent to New Relic via their platform, <u>is not stored in the</u> staging environment.

An investigation revealed that the unauthorized access was due to stolen credentials and social engineering related to a New Relic employee account.



credentials to gain access to our staging environment, where they were able to view certain data pertaining to





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The unauthorized actor used the stolen credentials to view certain customer data within the staging environment.

Customers confirmed to be affected by this incident have been notified and given recommended next steps.

There is no evidence of lateral movement from the staging environment to customer accounts in the separate production environment or to New Relic's production infrastructure.

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and social engineering in connection with a New Relic employee account. The unauthorized actor used the stole credentials to gain access to our staging environment, where they were able to view certain data pertaining to our customers' use of New Relic. **Customers confirmed to have been impacted by this incident have been**

NOW BACK TO OUR REGULARLY SCHEDULED PROGRAMMING





https://www.wordfence.com/blog/2023/12/psa-fake-cve-2023-45124-phishing-scam-tricks-users-into-installing-backdoor-plugin/

PSA: Fake CVE-2023-45124 Phishing Scam Tricks Users Into Installing Backdoor Plugin



A phishing campaign is targeting WordPress users.

The campaign tricks victims into installing a malicious backdoor plugin on their site.

The phishing email claims to be from the WordPress team and warns of a Remote Code Execution vulnerability on the user's site with an identifier of CVE-2023-45124, which is <u>not</u> <u>currently a valid CVE.</u>

The email prompts the victim to download a "Patch" plugin and install it.

If the victim downloads the plugin and installs it on their WordPress site, the plugin is installed with a slug of wpress-security-wordpress and adds a malicious administrator user with the username wpsecuritypatch.





The malicious plugin also includes functionality to ensure that this user remains hidden.

Additionally, it downloads a separate backdoor from wpgate[.]zip and saves it with a filename of wp-autoload.php in the webroot.

This separate backdoor includes a hardcoded password that includes a file manager, a SQL Client, a PHP Console, and a Command Line Terminal, in addition to displaying server environment information.

Into Installing Backdoor


Plugin








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www.opencve.io

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Explore the CVE database

Exploitability: 3.9 / Impact: 6.0

https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/security.html

References

OpenCVE lets you search inside the whole CVE list and filter the results according to your needs: by Vendor, Product, CVSS or CWE.

Privileges Required

User Interaction


Availability Impact

You can even create your own tags (unread, important, devteam...) and organize the CVE based on your own criteria.


>> Display the last critical CVE


Analyse the CVE details

OpenCVE is synchronized with the NVD feed, so each CVE displays















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Details and Caveats for ownCloud information disclosure (CVE-2023-49103)

Explore our deep-dive into CVE-2023-49103, a critical vulnerability in ownCloud's Graph API. We discuss the exploit, its impact on Docker installations, and our comprehensive testing process. Learn about the role of Apache's mod_rewrite and the htaccess.RewriteBase rule in mitigating the vulnerability. Ideal for cybersecurity professionals and technologists.

OWNCLOUD VULNERABILITIES PODMAN DOCKER DISCLOSURE

AUTHOR

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PUBLISHED

November 29, 2023









http://www.greynoise.io/events/webinar-greynoise-sift-how-to-leverage-the-power-of-ai-ml-to-improve-threat-analysis

GREYNOISE

WEBINAR

GreyNoise Sift: How to Leverage the Power of AI/ML to Improve Threat Analysis

Thursday, December 14th | 10:30am CT / 11:30am ET



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WEBINAR SERIES


GreyNoise Tags Deep Dive 101, 201, 301

January 10th, 17th, 24th | 12:00pm CT / 1:00pm ET

http://www.greynoise.io/events/webinar-series-greynoise-tags-deep-dive











CISA Removes One Known Exploited Vulnerability From Catalog

Release Date: December 01, 2023

CVE-2022-28958

https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2023/12/01/cisa-removes-one-known-exploited-vulnerability-catalog









WE NEED

TO TALK

ABOUT

KEV







It Has Been

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Days Since The Last KEV Release

https://observablehq.com/@greynoise/greynoise-tags



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- Google Skia Integer Overflow Vulnerability (CVE-2023-6345)
- ownCloud graphapi Information Disclosure Vulnerability (CVE-2023-49103)
- Apple Multiple Products WebKit Memory Corruption Vulnerability
 (CVE-2023-42917)
- Apple Multiple Products WebKit Out-of-Bounds Read Vulnerability (CVE-2023-42916)

https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog



CVE-2022-28958 was rejected from the CVE list because further investigation showed that it was not a security issue. This CVE was initially reported as a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the D-Link DIR816L_FW206b01 firmware, specifically via the value parameter at shareport.php. However, this claim was disputed by a third party.

A detailed analysis by VulnCheck found that CVE-2022-28958 is not a real vulnerability and at-scale exploitation has never occurred. The vulnerability was initially reported to be exploited by Moobot, a Mirai-like botnet, but this was found to be incorrect. The report also pointed out that without a working bypass, an attacker would need to be authenticated to the device, a detail that was overlooked when assigning CVE-2022-28958 a CVSSv3 score of 9.8.

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IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in Multiple Sectors, Including U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems Facilities

Release Date: December 01, 2023 Alert Code: AA23-335A

RELATED TOPICS: ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREATS AND NATION-STATE ACTORS, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE, CYBER THREATS AND ADVISORIES

https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-335a

- (i) ACTIONS TO TAKE TODAY TO MITIGATE MALICIOUS ACTIVITY:
- 1. Implement multifactor authentication.
- 2. Use strong, unique passwords.
- 3. Check PLCs for default passwords.



The IRGC is an Iranian military organization that the United States designated as a foreign terrorist organization in 2019. IRGC-affiliated cyber actors using the persona "CyberAv3ngers" are actively targeting and compromising Israeli-made Unitronics Vision Series programmable logic controllers (PLCs). These PLCs are commonly used in the Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS) Sector and are additionally used in other industries including, but not limited to, energy, food and beverage manufacturing, and healthcare. The PLCs may be rebranded and appear as different manufacturers and companies. In addition to the recent CISA Alert, the authoring agencies are releasing this joint CSA to share indicators of compromise (IOCs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) associated with IRGC cyber operations.



IRGC-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit PLCs in

Since at least November 22, 2023, these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors have continued to compromise default credentials in Unitronics devices. The IRGC-affiliated cyber actors left a defacement image stating, "You have been hacked, down with Israel. Every equipment 'made in Israel' is CyberAv3ngers legal target." The victims span multiple U.S. states. The authoring agencies urge all organizations, especially critical infrastructure organizations, to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this advisory to mitigate risk of compromise from these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors

- 2. Use strong, unique passwords.
- 3. Check PLCs for default passwords.







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